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The Power of Focal Points is Strong:  
Coordination Games with Labels and Payoffs 
 
Abstract: People’s ability to coordinate on salient labels has been widely reported since Schelling. 
However, it is not known how players behave when label salience conflicts with payoff 
dominance. We consider such games by independently varying the two elements, focusing 
especially on cases where the two criteria conflict. We also introduce a new form of the game, in 
which players choose labeled strategies in response to a stimulus.  In games with no reference 
stimulus, behavior is consistent with a simple model, according to which strategic players 
assume their naïve counterparts choose the higher payoff. In games with a reference stimulus, 
behavior is consistent with a model in which strategic players assume their naïve counterparts 
choose the label that is more salient to them, except perhaps where the two labels’ salience are 
very similar, in which case the higher payoff is chosen. A key finding is that in the presence of a 
stimulus, play is best explained by a model in which players choose according to label salience, 
even against the combination of payoff and risk dominance. 
 
Introduction 
Coordination games are a type of game with multiple equilibriums and in which players’ incentives are 
aligned. They are widely studied and are considered as capturing important aspects of many economic 
activities.  The strategic uncertainty in coordination games results from their simplicity, there being no 
obvious rational basis on which a strategic player can anticipate his/her partner’s choice (Colman 2003).   
Research on focal points, beginning with Schelling (1960) , has demonstrated that when strategies are 
associated with common knowledge labels, players may utilize the information conveyed by the labels 
to facilitate coordination. To each individual, one of the labels may be “salient”, and this may influence 
the player’s choices. For example, if there are two strategies with identical payoffs and one is labeled 
“Blue” and the other “Green”, a higher than random fraction of p layers will choose the strategy labeled 
“Blue”, thereby increasing the coordination rate (Mehta, Starmer et al. 1994).  
A second stream of research has explored the influence of payoffs. When there is a payoff-dominant 
solution, it is widely assumed that each player will do his/her part by choosing the corresponding 
strategy (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), which results in a Pareto efficient outcome.  
In this paper, we consider games in which label salience and payoff-dominance clash. In particular, we 
consider games with symmetric payoffs, in which one strategy is payoff dominant and a different 
strategy is associated with a more salient label. An example is shown in Figure 1. Assuming that the label 
“Blue” is more salient than “Green” among a population of players – Mehta et al. found that it is – then 
label salience and payoff salience recommend different strategies. This paper addresses the question of 
how players will behave in such a game.  
Figure 1 Coordination Game with Strategies Characterized by Payoffs and Labels  
 Column Player 
Blue Green 
Row 
Player 
Blue 5, 5 0, 0 
Green 0, 0 10, 10 
 
It is difficult to make any a priori prediction. Both criteria – payoff dominance and focal points -- lie 
outside the scope of orthodox game theory (Colman 2003), though formal theories have been proposed 
for both (Sugden 1995; Colman and Bacharach 1997; Jannsen 2001).  Indeed, Harsany and Selten (1988) 
propose that payoff dominance is a kind of focal point, making it still more difficult to predict which 
criteria, if any, will be preferred. Furthermore, empirical research shows that both criteria are 
inconsistent and/or sensitive to details of the game. For example, payoff dominance fails when it 
conflicts with risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988), and even when it doesn’t (Cooper, DeJong et 
al. 1990), while label salience fails to guarantee coordination in games with asymmetric payoffs 
(Crawford, Gneezy et al. 2008). Since the games we consider involve two conflicting, unorthodox, and 
inconsistent criteria, it is difficult to make a priori predictions.  
Moreover, existing theoretical approaches to focal points require extension or elaboration before they 
can be applied to the games considered here. There are two main theoretical approaches to salience 
and focal points (Mehta, Starmer et al. 1994) – (1) cognitive hierarchy (Stahl and Wilson 1995; Camerer, 
Ho et al. 2004; Bardsley, Mehta et al. 2009) and (2) team-reasoning (Bacharach 1993; Sugden 1995).Our 
primary focus in this paper is on cognitive hierarchy. We extend it to make predictions in the game we 
study, and explore how results may be interpreted within that framework. A concluding discussion 
briefly considers what the observed behavior might mean under team reasoning, but this is not our 
main focus.  
In order to address the game we study, we augment cognitive hierarchy in a number of ways. One 
significant innovation of our paper is that we introduce and formalize a notion of degree of label 
salience at the level of an individual.  Most prior research has considered label salience as a population-
level phenomenon, meaning that for each individual, only one label is salient, with the degree of label 
salience being defined only at the population level, as the proportion of individuals for which it is the 
salient one (Bardsley, Mehta et al. 2009). Here, we model an individual-level effect of label salience, 
which means that a label has a degree of salience to each individual. 
A second innovation within the hierarchical framework is that we consider variable as well as fixed 
effects, for both payoffs and labels. A fixed effect means that the individual chooses the strategy with 
higher payoff or more salient label, with a fixed probability that is higher than random. A variable effect 
is that the individual chooses the strategy with higher payoff or more salient label, with a probability 
that corresponds to the magnitude of the difference in payoffs or salience. Regarding payoffs, this is a 
shift from prior work, which has considered only a fixed payoff bias (Crawford, Gneezy et al. 2008). 
Regarding labels, this is also new. A variable effect, whereby an individual’s behavior depends on the 
degree of label salience, was not possible under the prevailing models that have defined a label’s degree 
of salience as something that emerges at the level of the population. But because we model degree of 
label salience as an individual level phenomenon, we are also able to investigate variable effects of label 
salience.  
The concept of individual-level degrees of salience leads, in turn, to methodological innovations. 
Bardsley et al. introduced the idea of picking and guessing tasks as a way of illuminating the factors 
driving players’ choices. In their picking tasks, players were simply asked to pick one label, irrespective of 
any other players; and in their guessing task, players were asked to guess what label was mostly 
commonly picked by guessers. We adapt these treatments to suit our theoretical framework in which 
each label has a degree of salience to each individual. In particular, in lieu of a picking task we have an 
“assessing” task in which each subject assigns a probability to each label, and a “guessing” task in which 
each subject guesses the average of those assessments. Using behavior in these treatments as a 
reference, we make predictions regarding the proportion of players in a coordinating treatment that will 
choose each strategy under the various proposed models being compared.  
An additional innovation – and one that is not specific to cognitive hierarchy -- is that we study two 
variants of the game, one of which is newly proposed. In the familiar version depicted in Figure 1, 
subjects are asked to choose a label a propos of nothing, e.g. “Choose a date” (Mehta, Starmer et al. 
1994) or “Choose one of these words”. The other variant, which we introduce, is the same except that 
players choose a labeled strategy in response to a reference stimulus. For example, players may be 
shown an image with respect to which they choose labels, i.e. labeled strategies. This variant is 
motivated by the observation that a contextual stimulus is present in many if not most settings for 
which coordination games are offered as providing relevant insights. This is a point to which we will 
return in section 5 where we introduce that game. We examine and interpret behavior in both versions 
of the game.  
We find support for simple models of behavior. Specifically, in the absence of reference stimuli, we find 
that players coordinate on the higher payoff, with label salience playing almost no perceptible role in 
players’ choice of strategies. In the presence of reference stimuli, results are very different. Here, the 
data is predicted well by a simple model in which each player chooses the strategy associated with the 
more salient (to him/her) label. Somewhat better predictions are made by refining that to a model in 
which players do consider payoffs, but only when the two labels’ salience levels (to him/her) are within 
about 13% of one another. To summarize, without reference stimuli, payoffs determine players’ choices, 
and with reference stimuli, labels dominate players’ choices. Both results are convincing in the sense 
that they handily out-perform all the other models that we consider. 
The most important and surprising result is that in the presence of a reference stimulus, behavior is 
explained by the focal points, even against the combination of payoff and risk dominance. This result 
can be modeled within a cognitive hierarchy approach as we have done, but is much more difficult to 
explain within a team-reasoning framework. 
1 Theoretical Development 
1.1 Preliminaries 
We study symmetric, one-shot coordination games for two players. For reasons to be elaborated below, 
we restrict our attention to games with only two strategies for each player to choose from; a discussion 
section briefly considers the case of games with more choices. Described in normal form using the 
notation from Bardsley et al., player i (i=1..2) chooses between strategies 𝑠𝑖𝑗 (j=1..2). If, for a given j, the 
two players choose strategies 𝑠1𝑗 and 𝑠2𝑗 respectively, they each earn 𝑈𝑗. In addition, there exists a set 
of labels 𝐿 = {𝐿1, 𝐿2}, and for a given j (j=1..2), strategies 𝑠1𝑗 and 𝑠2𝑗 are associated with label 𝐿𝑗. Due to 
the game’s complete symmetry, for convenience we may drop the first subscript and write simply of 
“strategy 𝑠𝑗” as being associated with label 𝐿𝑗 and coordinating payoff 𝑈𝑗. In addition, due to the 
association between strategies and labels, we write “choose 𝐿𝑗” as shorthand for “choose the strategy 
associated with label 𝐿𝑗”. Labels are meaningful in the sense of being recognizable words or symbols in 
the players’ language or culture (Bardsley, Mehta et al. 2009), and which may therefore facilitate 
coordination through the emergence of focal points.  
Within classical game theory, which ignores the labels, the game has two symmetric pure strategy 
equilibriums, as well as one mixed strategy equilibrium. Equilibrium refinements predict that players will 
choose the payoff dominant strategy if it exists, i.e. if 𝑈1 ≠ 𝑈2. Where 𝑈1 = 𝑈2, classical game theory 
does not make definitive predictions about which strategy players will choose. The theory of focal points 
has been developed to address games of this type, i.e. coordination games with meaningful common 
knowledge labels and equal payoffs, i.e. 𝑈𝑖 =  𝑈𝑗  for all i,j.  
Our reason for restricting our attention to games with two strategies for each player is that we focus on 
cognitive hierarchy not team reasoning. As noted by Bardsley et al., the two frameworks may coincide, 
as when a player sees no better selection rule than “follow secondary salience”. As our main interest is 
in hierarchical models, we prefer games in which the two frameworks coincide in this manner. We view 
this as being more likely in games that have only two choices, where the principle of insufficient reason 
is more likely to apply (to both) because there cannot be an “odd man out”. Indeed, we know of no 
empirical work within the team reasoning framework that studies games with two choices. This is our 
reason for restricting our attention to games with two strategies.  A discussion section returns to this 
point.  
We begin by reviewing Bardsley et al.’s cognitive hierarchy theory, which we adopt as a baseline that we 
then modify and build upon. In Bardsley et al.’s theory, Level-0 players do not act strategically but simply 
pick a label according to a probability distribution 𝑝0. Probability 𝑝𝑗0 of label j’s being picked in such a 
task is called that label’s degree of primary salience in their framework. A level 1 player, in turn, is 
defined to have beliefs about which label would be chosen by the largest number of level-0 players, i.e. 
to guess the mode of 𝑝0. If these beliefs are aggregated across all level players at level 1 and higher, the 
result is a probability distribution denoted 𝑝1.  
Similar reasoning may be used to define level-2 players, whom we model as believing their partners are 
level 1.  Two differing simplifying assumptions appear in the literature. Bardsley et al. assume that each 
level n (𝑛 ≥ 2) player envisions all players at level n-1 as have the same beliefs that they do, so that the 
beliefs of higher level players follow the same distribution as level 1 players. This allows treating all 
levels n (𝑛 ≥ 1) identically. Crawford et al. (2008), by contrast, assume perfect knowledge among level 
2 players, meaning that they know the distribution of choices made by level 1 players. This approach 
requires accounting for level 2 players separately from level 1. We will make predictions and show 
results under both assumptions. We do not model beyond level 2.  
Our theoretical framework builds upon Bardsley et al.’s cognitive hierarchy, but modifies and extends it 
in the following three ways: (1) It considers an individual level degree of label salience; (2) it considers 
payoffs; (3) it allows both fixed and variable effects for both labels and payoffs.  
2 Theoretical Framework  
The various models that we will propose – and test empirically – are all defined within the extended 
hierarchical framework we develop, which we call cognitive hierarchy with individual-level label salience 
and payoffs. The first innovation of this framework is the introduction of an individual level degree of 
label salience. This element will be formalized following a preliminary discussion. 
2.1 Cognitive Hierarchy with Individual-level Label Salience 
We depart from prior work in considering that labels may affect an individual player’s choice in 
proportion to its relative salience to that individual. It is not new that a label may be salient to one 
individual and not to another; this is largely assumed in the focal point literature. Similarly, it is not new 
that in the aggregate, each label has its own probability of being salient (to a random individual); this is 
utilized in Bardsley et al.’s framework1. What is new in our paper is that we consider that each label has 
a degree of salience to each individual, not just in the aggregate.  
This idea has some basis in the literature, though to our knowledge it has not been previously 
incorporated into a formal model. Mehta et al. (1994) allow a related idea that the process that brings 
one label to mind might be stochastic, such that various labels might come to one’s mind with different 
probabilities, with the distribution differing between individuals. Ho and Chen (2009) take this one step 
further, specifying a frequency-based interpretation of such a probability, according to which, for each 
player, each label occurs with a certain frequency. These conceptualizations still retain the idea that 
ultimately, a single label enters one’s mind on any given occasion, except that a stochastic process 
chooses which one. As an alternative, we might conceive of all labels as entering an individual’s mind to 
varying degrees that may differ across individuals. In such a conceptualization, when an individual is 
forced to make a single choice, a stochastic process chooses one of the labels, with probabilities that 
reflect the degree to which each label had occupied  his/her mind. In our framework, any of the above 
conceptualizations is valid. Our approach will only assume that for each individual, each label has a 
degree of primary salience that defines the probability that that individual will select it in a picking task. 
A label’s degree of salience may be viewed as probability of entering one’s mind – in which case, in a 
picking task, the individual chooses the one that’s in his/her mind. Or, a label’s degree of salience may 
be viewed as the extent to which it occupies one’s mind – in which case, in a picking task, this extent 
defines the probability that that individual will pick that label. Our model applies equally to these 
conceptualizations.  
For each level 0 individual i in the game defined in section 1.1, we define 𝑝𝑖𝑗0  as the probability with 
which player i would pick label j. This represents label j’s degree of salience for individual i. The 
probability 𝑝∙𝑗0  denotes the average degree of salience of label j across players. Finally, 𝑝∙0 denotes the 
distribution comprised of 𝑝∙𝑗0  for all labels j.  
Level 1 players are modeled as having beliefs about level 0 players. Our models depart significantly from 
Bardsley et al., where “𝑝1 is not a belief that can be attributed to any player, or to players in general”. In 
                                                          
1 One can interpret that Bardsley et al. conceive that for each individual, one of the labels has primary salience. 
This would be consistent with – but not implied by – their model. Even with this addition, however, a label’s 
degree of primary salience would still be defined only at the level of the population, as the probability that it is 
chosen by a random draw from 𝑝0.  
our different approach, for a player i at cognitive level 1 or above, we define 𝑝𝑖𝑗1  as player i’s belief 
regarding the degree of salience of label j to level-0 players. We adopt a homogeneity assumption, 
according to which level 1 players view level 0 players as homogenous. Accordingly, beliefs 𝑝𝑖𝑗1  that are 
held by a level-1 player i reflect his/her beliefs about the degree of salience of label j to every level 0 
player, not (merely) to level 0 players on average, i.e. not (merely) his/her beliefs about 𝑝∙𝑗0 . Distribution  𝑝𝑖1 denotes player i’s distribution of such beliefs about all labels. As we will develop in the next section, 
predictions about the distribution of choices made by level 1 players depend on the fraction of level 1 
players i whose beliefs 𝑝𝑖1 satisfy some property. It suffices here to note that we have no need for 
estimates of the average beliefs among level 1 players. Rather, predictions for the coordination game 
will require estimates of the fractions of level 1 players whose beliefs satisfy various properties.  Figure 2 
gives an example of the above definitions.  
Figure 2 Example Calculation 
Degree of salience of each of two labels to three 
level 0 players 
  Label A Label B 
 
Level-0 
individual 
1 .75 .25 
2 .50 .50 
3 .60 .40 
  𝑝∙𝑗0= 𝑎𝑣𝑔(. 75, .5, .6)= .62 𝑝∙𝑗0= 𝑎𝑣𝑔(. 25, .5, .4)= .38 
  𝑝∙0 = (. 62, .38) 
 
Beliefs of three level-1 players about degrees of 
salience to level 0 players 
  Label A Label B  
 
Level-1 
individual  
1 .70 .30 𝑝11 = (.7, .3) 
2 .80 .20 𝑝21 = (.8, .2) 
3 .55 .45 𝑝31 = (.55, .45) 
 
 
2.2 Cognitive Hierarchy with Payoffs 
Our framework also incorporates payoffs. For utility maximizing level 1 players, incorporating payoffs is 
straightforward: their choices are determined by comparing the products of an appropriate probabilistic 
belief – the various models we will develop within our framework differ on what probability that is -- 
and the numerical value of the payoff.  
Regarding level 0 players, no new “machinery” is needed for payoffs as it was for labels, except for the 
stipulation that players think of the game as we have described it in section 1.1, with strategies having 
associated labels, and separately from that, associated coordinating payoffs. In particular, players treat 
payoffs as distinct from labels, and understand their significance as numerical payoffs that confer utility. 
The significance of this becomes clear when we consider the alternative: Bardsley et al. propose that 
level 0 players are “completely unaware of the significance of payoffs” (ibid. p. 50) or that they respond 
to a higher payoff with a more positive affect, “in the same sense that … <<Porsche>> is a more 
attractive label then <<Volkswagen>>”.  If we interpret this to mean that players actually treat payoffs 
as additional labels, then the approach seems unworkable in our setting. The reason is that strategies in 
our game are characterized by both labels and payoffs, and if payoffs are not distinguished from labels, 
we face the dubious prospect of modeling level 0 players as somehow responding to pairs of labels, such 
as {“Blue” “5”} versus {“Green” “10”}. This does not seem to us a promising direction, and none of our 
proposed models involve this sort of reasoning. Instead, our framework assumes that players treat 
payoffs as distinct from labels. In addition, it assumes that payoffs are different from labels in having an 
objective meaning, so that unlike for labels, we do not model how level 0 individuals vary in their 
response to payoffs. 
2.3 Fixed and Variable Effects 
The third and final category of additions that distinguish our framework is the possibility of variable as 
well as fixed effects. This section introduces these modeling elements. 
2.3.1 Fixed and Variable Effect of Payoffs 
It seems straightforward enough to consider that players – especially level 0 players within a cognitive 
hierarchy framework -- might prefer (i.e. be more inclined to choose) a strategy in relation to the 
magnitude of its payoff. Yet prior literature has not taken this approach. For example, Crawford et al. 
modeled a fixed bias towards the higher payoff, rather than a variable effect. Similarly, Bardsley et al. 
quoted above seem to take this one step further, by offering a psychological theory whereby players 
respond to payoffs as to labels. By contrast, in our model players treat numbers separately from payoffs, 
and as the numbers that they are. Within those assumptions, our framework allows modeling that a 
fixed effect in which (all) players favor the higher payoff with the same fixed bias, or a variable effect in 
which (all) players favor payoffs in accordance with their magnitude.  
When a fixed payoff 𝑝𝑈 bias is in effect, it means that (all) level 0 players choose the strategy with the 
higher payoff with a probability (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈) and the other strategy with probability (. 5 − 𝑝𝑈). A variable 
payoff bias means that all level 0 players choose each strategy 𝑠𝑗 with probability 𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘. 
2.3.2 Fixed and Variable Effect of Labels 
A fixed bias in favor of (the strategy associated with) label 𝐿𝑗 means that the level 0 player chooses the 
associated strategy 𝑠𝑗 with a higher than random probability. We denote such a bias as 𝑝𝐿 to indicate a 
labels bias, and its effect is that a level 0 player chooses the strategy whose associated label is more 
salient (to him/her) with a probability (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿) and the other strategy with probability (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿). 
Variable effects mean that the magnitude of the bias depends on the magnitude of the difference in 
payoffs or salience. A variable labels bias means that a level 0 player i chooses each strategy 𝑠𝑗 with 
probability 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 . The possibility of a variable labels bias is made possible by the introduction of the 
individual-level degree of salience, 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 . 
3 Models and Predictions 
We adopt the following general principles in all the models we will explore within our extended 
hierarchical framework: (1) level 0 players are assumed to have zero frequency in the population 
(Crawford, Gneezy et al. 2008), even though their imagined behavior drives the models. (2) Level 1 
players assume that level 0 players are homogeneous. (3) When utility-maximizing level 1 players are 
faced with two equal expected values, they choose randomly between them. 
We propose three alternate structures for the modeling of level 0 players, whose behavior drives that of 
strategic higher-order players. We will develop predictions under each structure, and compare them 
empirically. The three structures are: 
Structure A: A level 0 player favors the higher payoff with a fixed or variable bias, unless its associated 
label salience is 𝑥1% lower than other choice, in which case he/she favors the more salient label with a 
fixed or variable bias.  
Put another way, when the two labels’ salience levels differ by more than x1%, a level 0 player 
favors the more salient label; otherwise the player favors the higher payoff. This treats payoffs 
as a tie-breaker for when label salience is similar.  
Structure B:  A level 0 player favors the more salient label with a fixed or variable bias, unless its 
associated payoff is 𝑥2% lower than other choice, in which case he/she favors the higher payoff with a 
fixed or variable bias. 
Put another way, when the two strategies’ payoffs differ by more than x2%, a level 0 player 
favors the higher payoff; otherwise the player favors the mode salient label. This treats label 
salience as a tie-breaker for when payoffs are similar.  
Structure C: Level 0 player considers label salience and payoffs equally, choosing according to the 
“product” of label salience and payoff.  
A few observations are in order. First, structures A and B each represents a family of four different 
specific models, depending on whether the payoff and label effects are modeled as fixed or variable. 
These possibilities are elaborated below, but turn out to have only minor impact, so it is appropriate to 
emphasize the main structure over those differences. Second, structures A and B have parameters 𝑥1 
and 𝑥2, respectively, that govern whether labels and payoffs, respectively, are sufficiently different that 
they come into play. Third, where structures A and B include a fixed effect, there is an additional 
parameter that defines the magnitude of the bias, 𝑝𝐿 for a fixed labels bias and 𝑝𝑈 for a fixed payoff 
bias, as introduced in section 2.3.3. Lastly, there are a few special cases that relate the models to one 
another. We will note these special cases after presentation of the models.  
3.1 Structure A 
In the first family of models we explore, any level 0 player is biased towards the strategy with higher 
payoff, unless that choice’s label is x1% less salient (to him/her) than the other, in which case he/she is 
biased towards the more salient label.  Put another way, as long as the two labels’ salience levels are 
within x1% of each other, a level 0 player is biased towards the higher payoff, otherwise the player is 
biased towards the more salient label. It remains to model whether the payoff and labels biases are 
fixed or variable.  
3.1.1 Model A1: Fixed payoff bias, fixed salience bias 
We first consider a model we call A1, with a fixed bias 𝑝𝑈 towards the higher payoff, and a fixed bias 𝑝𝐿 
towards the mode salient label, when label salience comes into play. In this model, a level 0 player 
prefers the higher payoff with fixed bias 𝑝𝑈, unless that choice’s label is x1% less salient (to him/her) 
than the other, in which case he/she chooses the more salient label with fixed bias 𝑝𝐿. The detailed 
behavior of level 0 players is shown in Figure 3.  
Figure 3: Level 0 players in Model A1 
Condition on payoffs Condition on salience Probability chooses sj 
 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1 + 𝑥1%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈)  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1 + 𝑥1%) (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿)  
 𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%) 0 
 𝑈𝑗 = 𝑈𝑘  𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1+𝑥1%) ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%)  .5 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1 + 𝑥1%) (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿)  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)  
 
From these, we derive the proportion of level 1 players choosing strategy 𝑠𝑗.  
If 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘  and his/her beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1(1+𝑥1%) then the player will choose  𝑠𝑗 
If 𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘  and 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘1(1+𝑥1%) then the player will choose  𝑠𝑗 if (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑗 > (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑘  
If 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘  and 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 (1 + 𝑥1%) then the player will choose  𝑠𝑗 if (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑗 > (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑘 
If 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘  and 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 (1 + 𝑥1%)  then the player will not choose 𝑠𝑗 
If 𝑈𝑗 = 𝑈𝑘  and 𝑝𝑖𝑘1(1+𝑥1%) ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 (1 + 𝑥1%) then the player will choose  𝑠𝑗 with probability .5 
3.1.2 Model A2: Variable payoff bias, fixed salience bias 
Next, we consider a similar model but replace the fixed payoffs bias with a variable payoffs bias. The 
behavior of level 0 players is thus changed from model A1 only in the first condition of Figure 3, whose 
probability of choosing 𝑠𝑗 is changed from (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈) to 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 . The behavior of level 1 players is not 
changed at all, and remains identical to model A1.  
3.1.3 Model A3: Fixed payoff bias, variable salience bias 
An alternative that does result in a slightly different model, is to model replace the fixed label bias 
(when it comes into play) with a variable effect. Details of level 0 behavior are shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Level 0 players in model A3 
Condition on payoffs Condition on salience Probability chooses sj 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1 + 𝑥1%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈)   
𝑝𝑖𝑗0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1 + 𝑥1%) 𝑝𝑖𝑗0   
 𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%) 𝑝𝑖𝑗0   𝑝𝑖𝑗0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%) 0 
 𝑈𝑗 = 𝑈𝑘  𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1+𝑥1%) ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%)  . 5  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘0(1 + 𝑥1%) 𝑝𝑖𝑗0   𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 (1 + 𝑥1%) 𝑝𝑖𝑗0   
From these, we derive the proportion of level 1 players choosing strategy sj. A level 1 player i will choose 𝑠𝑗 as follows: 
 if 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘 and his/her beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1(1+𝑥1%)  
if 𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘  and /her beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘1(1+𝑥1%) and 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘  
if 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘  and /her beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 (1 + 𝑥1%) and 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘 
if 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘  and /her beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 (1 + 𝑥1%)  then the player will not choose 𝑠𝑗 
if 𝑈𝑗 = 𝑈𝑘  and beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑘1(1+𝑥1%) ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 (1 + 𝑥1%) then player will choose sj with 
probability .5; 
3.1.4 Model A4: Variable payoff bias, variable salience bias 
The behavior of level 0 players is thus changed from model A3 only in the first condition of Figure 4, 
whose probability of choosing 𝑠𝑗 is changed from (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈) to 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 . The behavior of level 1 players is not 
changed at all, and remains identical to model A3.  
3.2 Structure B 
In this alternative structure, which represents a sort of “opposite” approach to structure A, a level 0 
player prefers the label that is more salient to him/her, unless that choice’s payoff is x2% lower than the 
other, in which case payoffs come into play. Put another way, as long the two strategies’ payoffs are 
within x2% of each other, a level 0 player prefers the more salient label, otherwise he/she prefers the 
higher payoff. It remains to model whether the labels and payoffs biases are fixed or variable.  
3.2.1 B1: Fixed Label bias, Fixed Payoffs bias 
First, consider a fixed bias for labels and for when payoffs come into play. Assume without loss of 
generality that for a given level 0 player i,  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 . Then if 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2) level 0 player i prefers 𝑠𝑗  with 
probability (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿). Otherwise, he/she chooses the higher payoff with probability equal to (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈). 
The detailed behavior of a level 0 player in this model is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Level 0 players for model B1 
Condition on salience Condition on payoffs Probability chooses sj 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0  𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)  𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) (. 5 − 𝑝𝑈)  
 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘0  𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈)  𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) 0 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 = 𝑝𝑖𝑘0  𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) ≤ 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%)  .5 𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) (. 5 − 𝑝𝑈)  𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈)  
From these, we derive the proportion of level 1 players choosing strategy 𝑠𝑗.  
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj if (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑗 > (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑘 
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj if (. 5 − 𝑝𝑈)𝑈𝑗 > (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈)𝑈𝑘   
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj if (. 5 + 𝑝𝑈)𝑈𝑗 > (. 5 − 𝑝𝑈)𝑈𝑘 
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) then the player will not choose 𝑠𝑗  
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) ≤ 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) then the player will choose 𝑠𝑗 with probability .5 
3.2.2 B2: Fixed Label bias, Variable Payoffs bias 
Next, consider a variable bias when payoffs come into play. Assume without loss of generality the for a 
given level 0 player i,  𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 . Then if 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2) level 0 player i prefers 𝑠𝑗  with a fixed bias. 
Otherwise, he/she chooses sj with probability equal to 
𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘. Figure 6 presents details. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Level 0 players for Model B2 
Condition on salience Condition on payoffs Probability chooses 𝑠𝑗 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0  𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)  𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) 𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘  
 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑘0  𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) 𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘  𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) 0 
 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 = 𝑝𝑖𝑘0  𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) ≤ 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%)  . 5  𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) 𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘  𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) 𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘  
 
The proportion of level 1 players choosing strategy sj in this version is then derived.  
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and his/her beliefs satisfy 𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) then the player will choose  𝑠𝑗 if (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑗 >(. 5 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑘 
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑗 < 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj if 𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘 𝑈𝑘   
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj if 𝑈𝑗𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑈𝑘𝑈𝑗+𝑈𝑘 𝑈𝑘 
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) then the player will not choose  𝑠𝑗 
If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 = 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) ≤ 𝑈𝑗 ≤ 𝑈𝑘(1 + 𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj with probability .5 
3.2.3 B3: Variable Label bias, Fixed Payoffs bias 
Model B3 posits a variable salience bias and a fixed payoffs bias. This model differs from model B1 only 
in the first condition of Figure 5 whose probability is changed from (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿) to 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 . Level 1 players’ 
behavior is also identical to Model B1, except for the first condition which becomes: If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and 
his/her beliefs satisfy 𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj if 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘. 
3.2.4 B4: Variable Label bias, Variable Payoffs bias 
Finally, consider model B4 with variable salience bias and a variable payoffs bias. This model differs from 
model B2 only in the first condition of Figure 6 whose probability is changed from (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿) to 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 . Level 
1 players’ behavior is also identical to Model B2, except for the first condition which becomes: If 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 >𝑝𝑖𝑘1  and his/her beliefs satisfy 𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%) then the player will choose sj if 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘. 
3.3 Structure C: Payoffs and Labels considered jointly 
Finally, we consider a structure in which level 0 players respond simultaneously to both labels and 
probabilities, with neither of them having logical primacy over the other. In these models, level 0 players 
are guided by the “product” of label salience and the corresponding payoff.  
3.3.1 C1: Fixed effect of “Product” of Payoff and Label Salience 
The first of two models we consider has a fixed effect, whereby a level 0 player i favors strategy 𝑠𝑗 with a 
fixed bias 𝑝𝑈𝐿 if 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 𝑈𝑘. Level 1 players then choose 𝑠𝑗 if their beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘, and 
the fraction of such players is is estimated by the fraction of guessers whose guesses satisfy 𝑔(𝑝∙𝑗0 )𝑈𝑗 >𝑔(𝑝∙𝑘0 )𝑈𝑘 as usual. We also allow a free parameter for this model. With this free parameter k, level 0 
player i chooses strategy 𝑠1 if 𝑝𝑖𝑗0𝑝𝑖𝑘0 > 𝑘 𝑈𝑘𝑈𝑗 . 
3.3.2 C2: Variable effect of “Product” of Payoff and Label Salience 
In the second variation, the level 0 player chooses strategy 𝑠𝑗 with a probability equal to the relative 
magnitude of the product of its label salience and payoff, i.e. 
𝑝𝑖𝑗0 𝑈𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑗0 𝑈𝑗+𝑝𝑖𝑘0 𝑈𝑘. In this case, level 1 players 
choose 𝑠𝑗 if their beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗+𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘 𝑈𝑗 > 𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘𝑝𝑖𝑗1 𝑈𝑗+𝑝𝑖𝑘1 𝑈𝑘 𝑈𝑘, with the fraction of such level 1 players 
estimated in the usual manner. In models C1 and C2, payoffs have significant weight, first influencing 
the naïve choices attributed to level 0 players, and then again influencing the utility-maximizing choices 
made by level 1 players, given level 0 choices. 
3.4 Special Cases 
When structure A’s parameter 𝑥1 is set sufficiently high –as high as the greatest percentage difference 
that any subject assigns to any pair of labels – the result is a special case in which level 0 players are 
biased towards the higher payoff exclusively. Similarly, when structure B’s parameter 𝑥2 is set 
sufficiently high – as high as the greatest percentage difference that any subject assigns to any pair of 
labels – the result is a special case in which level 0 players are biased towards the more salient label. 
These are the only truly reduced special cases. The logic of the models when 𝑥1 = 0 or 𝑥2 = 0 is 
presented in Table 1 
 
Table 1: Intuition of Special Cases 
 Level 0 Level 1 
Structure A’s 𝑥1 
sufficiently high 
Choose higher payoff Choose higher payoff 
Structure B’s 𝑥2 
sufficiently high 
Choose more salient label Choose more salient label 
𝑥1 = 0:  If higher payoff and more salient, 
invoke a (positive) payoffs bias; 
If higher payoff and less salient, 
invoke a (negative) labels bias; 
If lower payoff and more salient, 
invoke a (positive) labels bias; 
If lower payoff and less salient,  
forget it 
If higher payoff and more salient, 
choose it; 
If higher payoff and less salient, 
consider the (negative) labels bias; 
If lower payoff and more salient, 
consider the (positive) labels bias; 
If lower payoff and less salient,  
forget it 𝑥2 = 0:  If more salient and higher payoff, 
invoke a (positive) labels bias; 
If more salient and lower payoff, 
invoke a (negative) payoff bias; 
If more salient and higher payoff, 
choose it; 
If more salient and lower payoff, 
consider the (negative) payoff bias; 
If lower salience and higher payoff, 
invoke a (positive) payoff bias; 
If lower payoff and less salient, 
forget it 
If lower salience and higher payoff, 
consider the (positive) payoff bias; 
If lower payoff and less salient,  
forget it 
 
3.5 Estimating the models’ predictions 
 
The models’ predictions depend on the proportions of level 1 players whose beliefs satisfy various 
conditions. As these probabilities are unknown, we follow Bardsley et al. in formulating testable 
predictions that relate behavior in a coordination game to the behavior of subjects in guessing 
treatments, patterned after Bardsley et al.’s picking and guessing treatments. In Bardsley et al.’s picking 
treatment, subjects were asked to pick one of a set of labels.  Adapting this treatment to our purposes, 
we rename it as an “assessing” treatment, and ask players to state, for each label, the probability of 
their selecting it. In Bardsley et al.’s guessing treatment, subjects were asked to guess which label was 
most frequently picked by pickers.  Adapting this treatment to our purposes, our guessers are asked to 
guess, for each label, the average probability assigned by assessors. We will denote the guess made by 
subject i in a guessing treatment about average probability 𝑝∙𝑗0  among level 0 players, as 𝑔𝑖(𝑝∙𝑗0 ) .  
The proportions of level 1 players whose beliefs satisfy the various conditions are estimated by using 
guessing players’ 𝑔(𝑝∙𝑗0 ) and 𝑔(𝑝∙𝑘0 ) in lieu of 𝑝𝑖𝑗1  and 𝑝𝑖𝑘1  in the stated conditions. For example, the 
proportion of level 1 players whose beliefs satisfy 𝑝𝑖𝑗1 ≥ 𝑝𝑖𝑘1(1+𝑥1%)  -- a condition that arises in structure A -
- is estimated by the proportion of subjects in a guessing treatment2 whose guesses satisfy 𝑔(𝑝∙𝑗0 ) ≥𝑔(𝑝∙𝑘0 )(1+𝑥1%).  
                                                          
2 Hypothetically, if a guesser imagines a skewed distribution, it is possible that he/she could think that one label 
had higher average salience but that the other label had higher salience to a larger fraction of assessors. In this 
sense, a more perfect treatment to estimate this fraction would be to ask subjects to guess which label had higher 
salience to a larger fraction of assessors. For many reasons, we chose to neglect this possibility. First, because for 
structure C we need the guesses of average salience, which information is lost if we ask which label had higher 
salience to a larger fraction of assessors. We could have run multiple versions of the guessing treatment, but we 
deemed it unnecessary, first because the possibility of a guesser having in mind a distribution that is skewed in 
that way seemed likely pertain to only a small minority if any guessers, second because it does not affect our data 
analysis in a systematic way, and third since we anyhow adopt a homogeneity assumption for level 1 players 
Finally, there are two approaches to modeling level 2 players. Under one possible simplifying 
assumption, the distribution of their beliefs is identical to the distribution at level 1, so no separate 
account is needed. In an alternative that we will also allow, level 2 players know the distribution of level 
1 behavior and respond perfectly. This approach requires that we take separate account of level 2 
players. Let 𝑟1 denote the proportion of level 1 players satisfying these conditions and therefore 
choosing 𝑠𝑗 under a given model. Then the proportion of higher-order players who choose 𝑠𝑗 under that 
model is 100% if 𝑟1𝑈𝑗 > (1 − 𝑟1)𝑈𝑘, 0% otherwise. We will make predictions under the first approach 
and label it as 𝑞 = 1 meaning that all players are level 1, and under the latter assumption we will make 
predictions for 𝑞 = .7   
4 Experiments  
We ran two separate sets of experiments, for games with and without stimuli. Study 1 reports results of 
the game with no stimuli, which is the game in the familiar form presented in Figure 1. The meaning of 
games with stimuli is presented in section 5 below. Much of the methodology is common to both 
studies, but the differences are sufficiently prominent that we opt to present the two separately.  
4.1 Study 1: No Stimuli 
4.1.1 Methodology  
The experimental design is patterned after Bardsley et al. (2008), who devised three experimental 
treatments: picking, guessing, and coordinating. Our picking treatment, which we rename as 
“assessing”, asks players to provide a percentage value for each label, not just to choose one. More 
specifically, the instructions asked the subject to state the probability that they would pick each label 
from among the two choices, with the two percentages totaling 100%. The instructions given to 
guessers quoted the instructions had been given to pickers, and asked them (the guessers) to guess the 
mean of the probabilities that they believe would have been assigned by the pickers. Twenty-five 
assessors provided responses for the full set of thirty-one label pairs. Their responses were used (only) 
as the basis to reward the group of thirty-seven subjects in a guessing treatment. Thirty-eight subjects 
participated in a coordination game treatment. In all treatments, the two labels in each pair were 
                                                          
whereby they view level 0 players as homogenous, and this assumption, if applied also to guessers, rules out any 
such effect (less restrictive assumptions can also rule it out). 
presented in a random order to each subject, and subjects were made aware of this so that they would 
not attempt coordination on the basis of label position.  
Each game in the experiment could be done on the basis of any pair of labels, as the theory is not 
sensitive to their meaning, nature, probabilities, etc. The origin of the particular label pairs used in both 
Study 1 and Study 2, is a focus group that was shown a series of thirty-one pictures and was asked to list 
labels that come to mind in response to each one. The researchers then chose two of the generated 
labels from each image, to form a pair. The images are the very same ones that are used in Study 2, so 
for that study, both labels have some meaning with respect to the image. But no harm is done by using 
the same set of label pairs in Study 1 where the image has been removed. The benefit of using the same 
label pairs is that it provides some commonality between the two admittedly different studies, to allow 
possible comparisons and interpretation. Experiments were conducted in the leading national university 
of a non-US country, and the labels used were in the country’s native language. The Appendix and 
various figures show labels in translation to English, but subjects saw them only in their native language.  
After running the guessing treatment, the researchers set up the coordinating treatment by setting, for 
each strategy 𝑠𝑗, a payoff 𝑈𝑗  that was imperfectly inversely proportional to the average of the ratio of 
salience values guessed by guessers. The coordinating payoffs were chosen such that the ratio  (𝑔(𝑝∙10 )𝑔(𝑝∙20 ))̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ : 𝑈2𝑈1 was distributed around 1, where (𝑔(𝑝∙10 )𝑔(𝑝∙20 )) denotes the average ratio (slightly different from 
the ratio of averages) of guesses regarding the label salience of labels L1 and L2 across individuals in the 
guessing treatment. Figure 7 presents the sampled part of the space. It is a noisy swath around the line (𝑔(𝑝∙10 )𝑔(𝑝∙20 ))̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑈2𝑈1 . The coordinating payoffs were calibrated to range from about 50-150 points. An 
Appendix shows the full set of label pairs, together with the average guesses of their salience by 
subjects in a guessing treatment, and the payoff for coordinating on each label. A second appendix 
shows screenshots of instructions given to subjects. 
Figure 7: sampled pairs of average relative salience versus relative payoff  
  
Regarding incentives, subjects in the assessing treatment received a fixed payment for their 
participation. They were asked to assign a percentage to each label. The importance of their honest 
assessments to the research was stressed. These responses were used only as a basis for rewarding 
subjects in the guessing treatment described next. Subjects in the guessing treatment received a 
payment that increased with the accuracy of their estimations. For each label they guessed the average 
of the probabilities that were assigned by subjects in the assessment task, and received for that guess a 
number of points equaling 100% minus the absolute difference between their guess and the true 
average. At the conclusion of the session, guessing subjects’ final payoff in real money was calculated 
according to the formula: (𝑌𝑖𝑌 ) 𝑀 where 𝑌𝑖  denotes player i’s total accumulated points for all guesses, ?̅? 
is the average points accumulated across players, and M is a parameter set by the researcher to 
approximately USD $20. Subjects in the coordination game treatment described next, similarly received 
payments according to that same formula, again with an average payment of USD $20. All sessions 
lasted less than one hour.  
Figure 8 shows an example of how coordination-game predictions were made for various models, based 
on individual-level data from the guessing treatment. There are two strategies, 𝑠𝑗 (arbitrarily named) 
which is associated with the label  𝐿𝑗 “Europe” and a coordinating payoff 𝑈𝑗 = 87, and 𝑠𝑘 which is 
associated with the label  𝐿𝑗 “Nightime” and a coordinating payoff 𝑈𝑘 = 108. The figure shows the 
guessing treatment data for three guessers, and the coordination-game predictions that would be made 
by models A1 if there were just these three guessing treatment subjects, for free parameter values of 𝑥1 = 30% and 𝑝𝐿=.1. 
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Figure 8: Example calculation 
Guessing 
Treatment 
Subject 
Label Average 
Salience 
Guess 
(%) 
Coordinating 
Payoff set 
for 
coordinating 
treatment, 
in light of 
guessing 
results 
Model A1 calculation 
element:  
Do this individual’s 
guesses satisfy  𝑈𝑗 <𝑈𝑘  and 𝑔(𝑝∙𝑗0 ) ≥𝑔(𝑝∙𝑘0 )(1 + 𝑥1%) when 𝑥1 = 30%? 
Model B1 calculation 
element:  
Do this individual’s 
guesses satisfy 
g(𝑝𝑖𝑗0 ) > 𝑔(𝑝𝑖𝑘0 ) with 𝑈𝑗 ≥ 𝑈𝑘(1+𝑥2%), when 𝑥2 = 30%? 
1 Europe 𝑠𝑗  .7 87  
1 
 
1 1 Nighttime 𝑠𝑘 .3 108 
2 Europe 𝑠𝑗 .85 87  
1 
 
1 2 Nighttime 𝑠𝑘 .15 108 
3 Europe 𝑠𝑗 .60 87  
0 
 
1 3 Nighttime 𝑠𝑘 .40 108 
 
Based on just these three guessers, one would predict according to model A1 for the given parameter 
values that 2/3 of level 1 players would choose strategy 𝑠𝑗 if (. 5 + 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑗 > (. 5 − 𝑝𝐿)𝑈𝑘, which is true 
here if 𝑝𝐿 > .055, while for model B1, 100% would choose 𝑠𝑗 under the same condition. From such 
percentages, we also derive the percentages of higher-order players choosing 𝑠𝑗. Finally, based on all the 
above, we derive the percentage of players that is predicted by each model to choose each strategy in a 
coordination game under various parameter settings. These predictions are then compared with the 
actual percentages choosing each label in the coordination game treatment.  
Figure 9 shows a label pair, sample data showing the average label salience values given by assessors 
and guessers for the two labels in this particular pair, coordinating payoffs set by the researchers for the 
coordination game, the coordinating treatment predictions for this image made for Model s A1 and B1 
on the basis of the fictitious example data from Figure 8 (in the real data analysis, these predictions are 
based on the full guessers data set), and the actual observed behavior of coordinators, for this one label 
pair among thirty-one. The predictive ability of the various models was evaluated in this manner, based 
on the full set of thirty-one label pairs. While previous research often reports a coordination index 
(Bardsley, Mehta et al. 2009), in our context it is important and more informative to report which choice 
players make in what proportions; to the extent coordination rates would be of interest, these could of 
course be directly derived. The statistical measure of predictive ability is the correlation or R-square 
between the percentage choosing an (arbitrarily chosen) reference label from each pair, and the 
percentage predicted by the model in question. AIC values do not add any information about model fit 
beyond the simple R-square or correlation.  
Figure 9: Example of Predictions and Actual choices 
 Payoff set by 
researchers for 
coordinating 
on that label in 
coordination 
treatment 
% coordination players 
predicted by Model A1 
to choose this label 
assuming q = 1 (or .7) 
with 𝑥1 = 30% and 𝑝𝐿=.1 
% coordination players 
predicted by Model  B1 
to choose this label 
assuming q = 1 (or .7%) 
with 𝑥2 = 30% and 𝑝𝐿=.1 
% coordination 
subjects choosing 
this label 
Label 1: 
Europe 
87 
 
66.6% (77%) 100% (100%) 6%  
Label 2: 
Nighttime 
109  33.3% (23%) 0% (0%) 94%  
 
4.1.2 Results of Study 1 with no Stimuli 
A first session of a coordinating treatment was conducted with eighteen subjects, the first batch from a 
total of thirty-eight subjects. Results were consistent and extreme, with almost every subject choosing 
the strategy with higher payoff in almost each case of the thirty-one.  This corresponds to proposed 
models A1-A2 with 𝑥1 set sufficiently high, and to B1-B4 with parameter 𝑥2 set to 0. Structure C 
performed reasonably well, but not nearly as well as models that considered only payoffs. It will be 
recalled that structure C places significant weight on payoffs, though with a different logic than models 
in structures A-B.  
Results are summarized in Table 2. For structures A and B, we show results when 𝑥1 or 𝑥2 take extreme 
values, and one moderate value, as sample points to help illuminate behavior. 
Table 2: Results of First set of Coordinating Data testing models 
Scenario  Model Free Parameter 
Values 
R-square when q=1 (q=.7) Comments about level 1 players 
1 A1-A4 𝑥1 = 200%  .86 (.86) Optimal parameter values for 
Structure A; 
Reduces to payoffs only 
2 A1-A2 𝑥1 = 40%, 𝑝𝐿 =.2 .32 (.49) Choose higher payoff unless labels differ by >40%, in which 
case bias towards salient label 
3 A3-A4 𝑥1 = 40%, 𝑝𝐿 =.2 .45 (.57)  
4 B1-B2 𝑥2 = 100%  Negative Correlation -.38 Fixed Labels bias only 
5 B3-B4 𝑥2 = 100%  Negative Correlation -.24 Variable Labels bias only 
6 B1-B2 𝑥2 = 40%, 𝑝𝑈 =.2 0 (0)  
7 B3-B4 𝑥2 = 40%  𝑝𝑈 = .2  .05 (.02)  
8 B1-B4 𝑥2 = 0  
 
.86 (.86) Optimal parameter values for 
Structure B; 
9 C1 𝑘 = 1  .08 (.15)  
10 C1 𝑘 = .5  0  
11 C2 No free 
parameters 
.52 (.49) Optimal model within Structure C 
 
It can be clearly seen that the best models by far are those in which level 0 players are assumed to 
choose the higher payoff. Note that the high values chosen for parameters 𝑥1, 𝑥2 in scenarios 1, 4, 5 
have no particular theoretical meaning; rather, their meaning is simply that in our particular data set, 𝑥1 = 200% is sufficiently high to reduce that model to considering payoffs only because 200% was the 
largest relative difference in salience assigned by any guessing player to a pair of labels. Similarly for 
payoffs, the largest payoff differential was 100%.  
 
As a result of the consistency of these first results, it was decided that for the second batch of twenty 
subjects, researchers would re-calibrate the payoff differential so that the strategy (say s1) with the less 
salient label (on average) was assigned a payoff that was only very slightly higher, so that the sampled 
space satisfied (𝐺1𝐺2)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ≪ 𝑈2𝑈1 rather than (𝐺1𝐺2)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑈2𝑈1. The idea was to ascertain if even small payoff 
advantage was sufficient to serve as a focal point even in the face of a significant disadvantage in label 
salience. A second set of twenty subjects played in a coordination treatment with these new payoffs, 
and here, although results were less extreme, the best models still focused exclusively on payoffs. The 
highest R-squares, .7 (.67) with q=1 (q=.7), were again achieved when with 𝑥1 = 8 and 𝑥2 = 0, reducing 
the models to considering payoffs only. Model C2 performed less well here, with an R-square of .16. 
  
4.1.3 Study 1: Discussion 
There was no evidence of across-game learning. Figures 13a-13b plot the coordination index (Bardsley, 
Mehta et al. 2009) – a measure of coordination rates that removes the accidental effect of random 
partnering -- against the order in which the image was presented to subjects. There is no upward 
statistically significant trend over time. Players in the coordination game appear to have chosen from 
the outset to always choose the higher payoff, regardless of label salience.  
Figure 10a Coordination index by order of games, 
set 1 
 
Figure 10b Coordination index by order of games, 
set 2 
 
 
For thirty-eight subjects on thirty-one label pairs, results consistently point to a near exclusive focus on 
payoffs. There were also significant differences in performance between the fixed and variable effects 
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versions of structures A and B. In particular, results were better for models with a variable effect of 
labels. However, these differences are limited to the sub-optimal ranges of parameter values, and are 
therefore less meaningful. The main result is the simple reliance on payoffs for coordination.    
Within cognitive hierarchy, these results are easily explained and perhaps expected, because payoffs are 
visible, concrete numbers, while label salience is an abstraction. This difference leads level 0 players to 
respond exclusively to the payoffs. Beyond that, our results complement those of Crawford et al. (2008) 
who found that level 0 players are conceived (by strategic players) as having a slight fixed bias to the 
higher payoff. This had left open the question of whether labels play any role at all in their game. Our 
results support an interpretation of behavior in their game to mean that level 0 players as giving a slight 
fixed bias to the higher payoff and as completely ignoring label salience. This is because we do not see 
any basis within cognitive hierarchy for theorizing that level 0 players assign no role to labels in our 
game where strategies have different payoffs, but do assign a role to labels in their game where players 
have different payoffs.   
The simplicity of results for Study 1 makes it seem unnecessary to have explored such a variety of 
possible models. As we will see in the following section, however, behavior in games with reference 
stimuli is different and more complex, and the variety of models helps to illuminate behavior.  
5 Study 2: Coordination games with reference stimulus 
This section introduces the second version of the game and reports experimental results. 
5.1 Motivation 
In this version, strategies are chosen with respect to a stimulus. To make this concrete, Figures 14a-b 
show screenshots of the game with and without a reference stimulus. In this section, we explain and 
motivate our interest in this version of the game, and specifically, in modeling how players respond to 
the combination of payoffs and label salience.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11a Screen Layout, games with no stimulus 
 
Figure 11b Screen Layout, games with stimulus 
 
 
Research on coordination games is frequently motivated as characterizing economic activity in many 
settings (Cooper, DeJong et al. 1990; Goyal and Janssen 1996; Young 1996). Experimental work on focal 
points, which explores people’s ability to coordinate in such games, has employed a variety of tasks, all 
of which require subjects to choose one among many labeled strategies. In most cases, the research 
design enumerates a number of labeled strategies from which subjects are asked to choose, as in Mehta 
et al.’s (1994) questions 11-20. In other cases, especially in earlier work, the strategies and their labels 
are not enumerated, as when subjects are asked to “Choose a Location”, or “Choose a Date” in Mehta et 
al.’s questions 1-10. But what is common to all experimental tasks of which we are aware, is that the 
choice is being made without reference to any stimulus, context, or story that conveys to subjects the 
purpose for which they are making the choice.  
We are motivated by the observation that in most situations, there is a context or stimulus, in the sense 
that the players wish to coordinate not for the sake of coordination per se, but for a contextual purpose.  
Consider a classic coordination game from Ochs (1990) in which buyers and sellers choose which 
location to go to. Coordination is achieved when buyers and sellers divide themselves among the various 
locations with the same proportions. An example might be Apple’s introduction of an iPhone to a new 
market. Interested consumers attempt to anticipate where they have the best chances of obtaining the 
device, while Apple tries to anticipate the volume to supply to each location. Modeled as a focal point 
game, the two sides might be choosing between labeled store locations such as (say) “5th Avenue”, 
“Soho”, and so on. Players in such a setting are not choosing a place to “meet” per se, but a place to 
meet in order to make an iPhone transaction. If players were choosing a place to meet in order to go to 
dinner, then surely those same labels would have different degrees of salience. The one situation we 
can identify in which people wish to coordinate per se, but not for any reason, are situations in which 
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two people have lost each other – in an amusement park, say -- and wish to re-unite. In almost every 
other economic or other setting we can conceive of, players wish to coordinate for an extrinsic reason, 
which provides a context from/within which labels derive their salience.  
Electronic commerce represents an increasing proportion of all retail activity (Winters, Davie et al. 
2011). Much economic activity on the World Wide Web can be characterized quite literally as a 
coordination game with meaningful labels, and here, too, the presence of reference stimuli is clear. 
Many searchers – whether for information or for products -- use search engines, which operate on the 
basis of matching the query words submitted by the searcher against a database of words called 
descriptors that represent various websites. It is a coordination game, because both sides choose words 
with the aim of matching one another. It is clear that searchers choose search words. As for websites, 
their descriptors are determined in one of two ways, both of which are also the result of active – and 
possibly strategic choices made by its owners. The first way is keyword ads, in which a website’s owners 
contract with a search engine to display its ad whenever a searcher’s query includes the specified word.  
The other way that websites get descriptors is via their organic text. Search engines assign every word 
that appears in a website as a descriptor for that website. Whether through keyword ads or organic text, 
website owners directly or indirectly determine the descriptors that are ultimately compared against 
users’ query words. The result is a coordination game in which searchers and relevant websites choose 
query words and descriptors, respectively, with both sides preferring to choose the same term, as this 
will enable them to encounter each other. Moreover, it is established that both searchers (Spink and 
Saracevic 1997) and vendors (Lohr 2006; Clifford 2009) choose words strategically, as envisioned in the 
cognitive hierarchy framework. In this economic setting, coordination games with meaningful common 
knowledge labels are not just a valid metaphor for describing the interactions, but are a literal 
description, because the participants actually choose among strategies that are identified with words.  
Moreover, the players in this setting do not choose words a propos of nothing. Rather, the information 
or product being sought or sold represents a contextual stimulus with respect to which players on both 
sides choose labels, and with respect to which labels draw their salience.  
This setting has also given rise to a concrete practical application of exactly the games considered here, 
where strategies are characterized by payoffs as well as labels, and in the clear presence of a reference 
stimulus. The practical problem arises because while search engines can easily assign descriptors to text 
by extracting words from a website, it cannot easily assign labels to images, which computers cannot 
“see”. The ESP game (von Ahn and Dabbish 2004) is a coordination game that was designed to address 
this practical problem, and was deployed by Google as “Google Image Labeler” from 2006 until 2011. In 
the game, two players each see an image and are asked to suggest labels for it, with the players 
receiving points if – and only if -- they choose the same term. The ESP game is designed to be sufficiently 
fun that players will play it voluntarily, with the benefit to the search engine that the images will thereby 
be labeled with meaningful descriptors. A limitation of the game was that – for reasons that are clear in 
light of focal point theories -- players tended to choose only the terms that are most “obvious” in some 
sense, and thus of least benefit to the search engine seeking to exploit human intelligence. Ongoing 
research in computer science aims to invent payoff schemes that reward players for choosing less 
obvious labels that may have a lower chance of resulting in coordination (Weber, Robertson et al. 2008). 
The problem facing game designers is that essentially nothing is known about how players behave in 
such a game, with higher payoffs for matching less salient words. This is precisely the sort of game we 
consider here. 
A question arises regarding the meaning of degree of label probabilities in the presence of a reference 
stimulus. As discussed in section 2.3.2, the literature on focal points with no reference stimulus supports 
a number of possible conceptualizations of individual-level degrees of label salience, including the 
extent, probability, or relative frequency with which a label enters one’s mind, while for games with a 
reference stimulus, Ho and Chen (2009) conceive of it as the probability or relative frequency with which 
the label is expected to co-occur with the stimulus in the same context (e.g. webpage).  
Based on the totality of the above literature, three aspects emerge regarding the nature of the 
connection between the stimulus and the values that may be assigned to labels: (a) the extent or 
probability to which the label might enter one’s mind in response to the image; (b) the extent to which it 
seems an appropriate description of the image; (c) the probability one would expect to see the label in 
the same context as the image. Although conceptually distinct, these three aspects all regard the 
strength of association between the stimulus and the label.  
In this section, we have motivated our interest in coordination games in the presence of reference 
stimuli, with respect to which players are choosing among labeled strategies. The formal models being 
tested are identical to the two games, except that for Study 2, all probabilities are understood to be 
conditioned on the given reference stimulus.  It is of course possible to also develop theory that 
explicitly accounts for this extra structure; in this paper, we do not advance such a theory.  
5.2 Experiments 
5.2.1 Methodology  
As discussed in section 5.1, there are a number of overlapping meanings to the degree of label salience 
in the presence of a reference stimulus.  A preliminary experiment indicated that the three aspects are 
highly correlated. In light of this, and because of the nature of our research purpose and the lack of any 
specific theoretical guidance on this point, we deemed it sufficient to consider all three aspects in 
combination. This means that subjects in our assessing and guessing treatments were instructed to think 
of the values they assign in terms of all three aspects enumerated above (see Appendix). In addition, 
unlike the game with no reference stimulus, here our assessing (and guessing) subjects were instructed 
that when assigning numbers to each of two labels for a given image, they should treat each number 
separately and the numbers did not need to sum to 100. If we denote the raw numbers thus elicited as 𝑣𝑖𝑗0 , we computed the necessary probabilities 𝑝𝑖𝑗0  as 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗0𝑣𝑖𝑗0 +𝑣𝑖𝑘0 , 𝑝𝑖𝑘0 = 𝑣𝑖𝑘0𝑣𝑖𝑗0 +𝑣𝑖𝑘0 . Our reason for 
instructing subjects to enter the two values separately in this study is that in the presence of a reference 
stimulus, there is meaning to the value assigned to a given label, while the meaning of a relative value is 
less straightforward. For example, one of the meanings supported in the literature is the probability that 
the label will be observed to co-occur with the stimulus. It would be odd to require that subjects convert 
those values into relative proportions (the probability that the label co-occurs with the stimulus, relative 
to the probability that the other label co-occurs with the stimulus?). This is opposite from an assessing 
task with no stimuli, where indeed the only straightforward meaning is relative, i.e. the probability that 
the subject would select the label from among the two; there is no other conceivable value to elicit (the 
value of the label per se). In this manner, the presence of a stimulus affects the meaning of the 
probabilities that describe level 0 players’ behavior.  
As with Study 1 with no stimuli, following elicitation of these guesses, preparations were made for a 
coordinating treatment by setting each strategy’s payoff to be roughly inversely proportional to the 
relative salience of its label in the guessing treatment.  The sampled space is depicted in Figure 12. As 
shown above in Figure 11b, instructions for the coordinating treatment were to choose a label to 
represent the image, with the payoff depending only on whether the two players chose the same label. 
Each player was shown the two labels in a random order, and this design element was disclosed to 
players so that they would not think to attempt coordination on the basis of label position. An Appendix 
shows the full set of images and associated label pairs, together with the average guesses of their 
salience by subjects in a guessing treatment, and the payoff for coordinating on each label. 
Figure 12 Sampled space for Study 2 
 
5.2.2 Results  
Table 3 presents a summary of results, highlighting the conditions under which each model performs 
well or not. We choose a sample of points from the space of free-parameter values. For structures A and 
B, we show results when 𝑥1 or 𝑥2 respectively are set sufficiently high to reduce the models to labels 
only or payoffs only. We also show a mid-range value, and the optimal parameter settings under each 
structure.  
Table 3: Results for Study 2 
Scenario  Model Free Parameter 
Values 
R-square when q=1 (q=.7) Comments – level 1 behavior 
described 
1 A1-A4 𝑥1 ≥ 8  Negative correlation -.58  Payoffs bias only 
2 A1-A2 𝑥1 = 13%, 
 𝑝𝐿 ≥ .14 .62 (.53) Optimal parameter values for A; prefer higher payoff unless labels 
differ by 13%, in which case 14% 
bias towards more salient label   
3 A3-A4 𝑥1 = 13%  0 Same as scenario 2, with variable 
labels bias 
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4 A1-A2 𝑥1 = 0,  𝑝𝐿 ≥ .14  .57 (.6) If more salient label and higher payoff, choose it;  
if less salient and lower payoff, 
forget it 
if less salient and higher payoff, 
or vice versa, labels bias 
5 A3-A4 𝑥1 = 0  .03 (0)  
6 B1-B2 𝑥2 ≥ .8, 𝑝𝐿 ≥ .14 .56 (.51) Fixed labels bias only 
7 B3-B4 𝑥2 ≥ .8, 𝑝𝐿 ≥ .14  .29 (.17) Variable labels bias only  
8 B1-B4 𝑥2 = 0  Negative correlation -.58 If more salient label and higher 
payoff, favorable bias; 
if less salient and lower payoff, 
forget it; 
 if less salient and higher payoff, 
or vice versa, payoffs bias 
9 C1 𝑘 = 1  .03  
10 C1 𝑘 = .5  0  
11 C2 No free parameters Negative correlation -.54  
 
The overall optimum is scenario 2, in which level 0 players are biased towards labels with a bias of 
14%, whenever label salience differs by 13% or more, in effect treating payoffs as a tie-breaker only 
when labels have comparable salience. The next best are scenarios 4 and 6, in which level 0 players 
choose according to label salience with or without regard to payoffs respectively, with a fixed bias of 
14% towards the more salient label. Models placing emphasis on payoffs did poorly. As between fixed 
and variable biases, fixed biases consistently out-performed comparable variables-bias models, including 
on optimal parameter settings.  
Figures 13-17 depict the scatterplots of predicted vs. observed, for optimal parameter values under each 
model as well as other specified values. The left column is with q=1, the right column with q=.7. For 
consistency, we also show a scatterplot even when a model makes binary predictions. The statistical 
correlation and associated R-square are the appropriate basis for comparing models’ predictions, even 
for models whose predictions are binary, as a phi coefficient yields the same result as a Pearson product 
moment correlation. 
Figure 13a Scenario 1 with q=1
 
Figure 13b Scenarion 1 with q=.7 
 
 
 
Figure 14a Scenario 2 with q=1 
 
Figure 14b Scenario 2 with q=.7 
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Figure 15a Scenario 4 with q=1
 
Figure 15b Scenario 4 with q=.7
 
Figure 16a Scenario 6 with q=1 
 
Figure 16b Scenario 6 with q=.7 
 
 
 
Figure 17a Scenario 7 with q=1 
 
Figure 17b Scenario 7 with q=.7 
 
 
All models’ predictions were better under the assumption that all players were level 1, without higher 
order players. This is an artifact of the modeling approach in which, under the assumption that the 
distribution of beliefs of level 2 players differs from that of level 1, they are assumed to all have perfect 
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knowledge of level 1 behavior and therefore they act in unison to further bi-polarize (narrow) the 
distribution of strategy choices.  
5.2.3 Study 2: Discussion 
The prominent result from this study is that in the presence of the reference stimulus, the data is 
explained by a model in which players choose according to labels, even against the combination of 
payoff and risk dominance.  
There was no evidence of across-game learning. Figure 18 plots the coordination index against the order 
in which the image was presented to subjects. There is no upward trend over time. Figure 19 refines this 
by separately showing the percentage choosing the higher payoff and the percentage choosing the 
higher (on average) salience label. It is also clear from this figure that labels play an important role in 
determining choices, and apparently a more important role than payoffs.  
Figure 18: Coordination index in order of games played 
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Figure 19: Choice of higher payoff or salient label in order of games played 
 
One might think to challenge our interpretation of results in terms of cognitive hierarchy, on the 
grounds that players will be trying to choose a good or correct label for the image rather than actually 
play a coordination game. It is important to clarify a few points. First, it was clear to all players that their 
reward depended solely on whether they matched their partner in choosing the same labeled strategy. 
Second, players at hierarchical level 1 and above are strategic, and in that sense it is their beliefs about 
the behavior of level 0 players that drives the model. Regarding level 0 players, the extent to which they 
consider the meaning of words and stimuli – including the fit between the word and the stimulus -- is 
precisely part of the research question being addressed here. Even naïve players are aware that 
strategies are associated with payoffs as well as labels, and if players’ choices are partly or primarily 
influenced by the labels and stimuli and not only payoffs, this answers our research question. Bardsley 
et al. were able to argue – not investigate -- that the behavior of level 0 players can be identified with 
the behavior of players who “just pick a label”. But in our case, it cannot be assumed that level 0 players 
“just pick a label for the image”. The difference is that in Bardsley et al.’s games, payoffs were identical 
in all coordinating outcomes. The point of our research is to investigate the behavior of level 0 players 
(as strategic players imagine it) when they “just pick” strategies that are associated with both labels and 
payoffs, or, in our Study 2, with both labels-for-the-stimulus and payoffs. We have found that when just 
picking strategies that are associated with both labels and payoffs, they pick based on payoffs, and when 
just picking strategies that are associated with both labels-for-the-stimulus and payoffs, they pick based 
on labels, except when the labels have (to them) comparable degrees of salience. 
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6 General Discussion 
We have seen that in games with no stimuli, players coordinate on labels, whereas in games with 
stimuli, the best predictors are models in which players prefer the strategy with more salient label, at 
least when the degrees of label salience are significantly different. This latter result means that with a 
reference stimulus, players choose according to labels even against the combination of payoff and risk 
dominance. This appears to be an important and unexpected result. 
Although not our main focus, this result also has implications for the relative merits of cognitive 
hierarchy versus team reasoning. Results of study 1 may be interpreted as indicating that “choose the 
higher payoff” is chosen as a decision rule over “choose the more salient label”. Within Bacharach’s 
variable frame theory (Bacharach 1993; Bacharach and Bernasconi 1997), payoffs may be viewed as 
more conspicuous than salience because payoffs are visible and therefore more likely to occur to one’s 
partner. If players frame the choice in this way, then the higher payoff will be chosen due to the theory’s 
rules of symmetry disqualification and payoff dominance. But it is not clear that Bacharach intends that 
payoffs themselves can be considered as a “family” of concepts that may be used to frame the problem 
in the first place. Sugden’s (1995) theory is more explicit on this point, as it defines a player’s private 
description of the game to include both labels and payoffs, and a player chooses a decision rule that is 
defined in terms of his private description. The remaining trick is to specify why “choose the higher 
payoff” is preferred to “choose the more salient label”. This is achieved within Sugden’s theory of 
collective rationality if we model that players know that individuals differ in their label salience. That 
would make the payoffs-based rule to be the collectively rational one, since it guarantees coordination 
in our games while the labels-based rule doesn’t.  
It is more difficult to explain results of study 2 in terms of team reasoning. Certainly, it is difficult to 
construct frames or decision rules that include – let alone recommend -- the contingent rule that is 
optimal in our data, viz. “choose the more salient label unless the two labels’ salience is within x1% of 
one another”. Even if we restrict ourselves to the simpler rule of choosing the more salient label, this is 
not payoff dominant, which violates a rule in Bacharach’s theory. Even within Sugden’s theory, it is 
difficult to see how the less reliable salience rule can be preferred to a payoffs-based rule. Team 
reasoning is not our focus in this paper, but it appears that results of Study 2 favor hierarchical models.  
6.1 Relation to Other Work 
Dugar and Shahriar (2009) consider games in which one strategy is payoff dominant and another is risk 
dominant. It is well known that players often fail to coordinate on the payoff dominant strategy, and 
coordinate instead on the Pareto inferior risk-dominant strategy. Dugar and Shahriar investigate 
whether label salience is sufficient to facilitate coordination on the Pareto efficient, payoff-dominant 
strategy. They find that it can be, depending on what they term the relative salience of the two labels. 
They implicitly define relative salience of one label 𝐿1 versus another 𝐿2 as the percentage of players 
choosing 𝐿1 in a coordinating treatment. Our work complements theirs, but is not directly related. In 
their games, higher payoffs correspond with label salience, whereas in our case they are inversely 
related. In addition, their work is not developed within a cognitive-hierarchical framework, and related 
to that, their notion of relative salience is different from the one used here, and even from the one 
implied by Bardsley et al. and other work within the cognitive hierarchical framework, where it is 
defined not as the probability of being chosen in a coordination game, but the probability of being 
chosen in a picking task.  
Crawford et al. (2008) studied coordination games with common knowledge labels and non-symmetric 
payoffs, i.e. where one player receives a higher payoff in one coordination outcome, and the other 
player receives a correspondingly higher payoff in the other. In their X-Y games for which a cognitive 
hierarchy framework was considered more appropriate than team reasoning, they found that (level 1 
players believe that) level 0 players have a small, fixed bias towards a higher payoff, which wipes out any 
discernible effect of focal points. Their result shows a case where focal point behavior is not in evidence, 
but their work leaves open the question of what role, if any, is played by labels in such games. Their 
model does not explicitly assign any role to label salience, and the only label pair they considered was 
literally “X” and “Y”, so their work offers neither theoretical nor empirical evidence about what role 
labels might play. Our work picks up a related point. We ask what role, if any, labels play in the face of 
payoff differences, except instead of studying asymmetric payoffs as in Crawford et al., our games have 
symmetric payoffs that differ between coordinating outcomes. We have shown that in this case, labels 
actually play no role whatever, at least in games with no stimuli. It remains an open question whether 
labels play any role in games with asymmetric payoffs such as Crawford et al.’s X-Y games.   
Summary and Conclusions 
 We set out to shed light on how players behave in coordination games whose strategies are 
characterized by both payoffs and meaningful, common knowledge labels. The general question follows 
directly from previous work, but little was previously known about how players will behave in such a 
game. We expected that both payoffs and labels would play a role, but lacking any theoretical basis for 
proposing any particular model a priori, we explored a variety of models to see which would best fit the 
data. We adopted and extended a hierarchical framework to include an individual level degree of label 
salience, payoffs, and fixed and variable effects for both.  
In coordination games with two strategies, one of which has higher label salience and one of which has 
higher payoff, level 0 players in the games with no stimuli were found to simply choose the strategy with 
higher coordinating payoff. In games with stimuli, level 0 players were found to choose the strategy with 
higher label salience whenever there was a 13% or more difference in the two labels’ salience to that 
individual, relying on payoffs as a tie-breaker when label saliences are similar. A simpler rule with almost 
the same predictive ability is that level 0 players always choose the strategy with the more salient (to 
them) label. Along the way, we have constructed a cognitive hierarchical framework with an individual-
level notion of degrees of label salience, with payoffs as well as labels, and variable and fixed effects for 
each. We attach particular significance to the formalization of an individual level degree of salience. 
Label salience is an individual-level phenomenon, and has been described as such throughout the 
literature, but this basic element has not to our knowledge been previously formalized. Finally, we have 
introduced a coordination game with reference stimulus, as being more representative of coordination 
games as they arise in realistic economic settings.  
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 Appendix: Screen Layouts of Instructions in all treatments, Studies 1 and 2 (in English translation) 
Study 1, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 1 
 
Study 1, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 2 
 
Study 1, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 3 
 
 
 
Study 1, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 1 
 
 
 
 
Study 1, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this experiment, you will be shown a series
of word pairs, one pair after another.
For each word, please assign the probability 
that you would choose that word,
if asked to choose one of the two.
The two numbers must sum to 100.
Continue to 
Example
For example, suppose we present the two labels
“mountain” and “nature” as seen below.
You might feel that if asked to choose 
one of these two words,
there is a 75% chance that you’d choose “mountains”
and a 25% chance you’d choose “nature”.
In this case, you’d fill in 75 and 25 
in the appropriate spaces below
Continue 
Instructions
Label Probability
mountain ? [%]
nature ? [%]
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Label Probability
Flying car [%]
Cartoon [%]
Done (go to 
next image)
For each of the two words, please assign a 
Probability between 0 %and 100% that describes the 
chance you’d pick that word, if asked to choose one.
The two numbers must sum to 100%
Any Questions?
Begin
Please wait for Instructor
Before proceeding
In this experiment, you will be shown a series
of word pairs, one pair after another.
In a previous experiment, we asked subjects what is the 
probability 0%-100% they would choose each word, if asked to 
choose one of them. The sum of the two numbers had to equal 100%
Your task is to guess the average probability that was assigned to 
each word by subjects in that other experiments. 
Your payment for this experiment will depend on how accurate
your guesses are.
Continue to 
Example
For example, consider the word pair below. 
In a previous experiment, we asked each subject the probability  0%-100%
that he/she would choose “mountain”, and the probability he/she would 
choose “nature”, if asked to choose one of them. 
The two numbers had to sum to 100%.
Your job is to guess what was the average probability that was given by
the subjects in that other experiment for each word, with the two 
guesses summing to 100% .
For example, you might guess that on average, people would assign a 
probability or weight of 75% to “mountain” and a probability of 25% to
“nature”. So, you would enter the numbers “75%” and “25%”
in the table below
Continue 
Instructions
Label Probability
mountain ? [%]
nature ? [%]
  
Study 1, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 3 
 
 
Study 1, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 4 
 
Study 1, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 5 
Example 
 
Study 1, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 6 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 1 
 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
2 
 
 
 
After you make your guesses, the computer will show you how accurate 
your guesses were. For each label, your guess will be judged according 
to the absolute difference between your guess and the actual average 
value assigned to that word by the subjects in the previous experiment. 
Your total score for each image depends on the accuracy of the two 
separate guesses. An example is shown below.
Continue 
Instructions
Label probability
you guessed 
was assigned 
by others
Actual 
probability
assigned by 
others
Absolute Difference
mountain 75% 80% |75 – 80| = 5 
nature 25% 20% | 25 – 20| = 5 
Total error 10 
Your points for this image 100-10 = 90 points 
for this round
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Label Probability
Flying Car 20 [%]
Cartoon 80 [%]
Done (see how 
accurate I was) 
For each of the two words, please guess what 
probability between 0% and 100% was assigned by 
subjects in a previous experiment, on average, 
as the probability that they would choose that word if asked
to choose between the two. The two numbers you enter
must sum to 100%, just as theirs did.
Done (go to 
next word pair)
Label probability
you guessed 
was assigned 
by others
Actual probability
assigned by others
Absolute 
Difference
Flying Car 20 % 35 % 15 
Cartoon 80 % 65 % 15 
Total error 30 
Your points for this image 100-30 = 70 
points for this
round
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
In this experiment, you will be shown a series
of word pairs, one after another.
You will be asked to choose one of the two words.
You will be assigned to a random partner, one of the other people
in the room, who is facing the same choice.
If you and your partner choose the same word, you will each receive 
the number of points that is shown for that label, for that round of play. 
If you and your partner choose different words, you will each receive 
0 points for that round.
Your final payment for this experiment depends on how many points
you accumulate throughout the whole session.
Continue to 
Example
For example, consider the choice of words
“mountain” and “nature” as seen below.
If you and your partner both choose the word “mountain”,
you will each receive 50 points.
If you and your partner both choose the word “nature”,
you will each receive 20 points.
If you and your partner choose different words from each other,
you will both receive 0 points for that round.
Continue 
Instructions
Word Payoff if 
match
mountain 50
nature 20
  
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 3 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
4 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 5 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
6 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 6 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
7 Example 
 
 
 
 
Candidate 
Words
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 mountain mountain 50 points
each
nature 20
Continue 
Instructions
After you and your partner (for that round) both make
your choices, the computer will show
you what choice your partner made, and
how many points you won (if you matched).
In this example, you would each earn 50 points
Candidate 
Words
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 20 points
each
nature 20 Nature Nature
Continue 
Instructions
In this example, you would each earn 20 points
Candidate 
Words
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 mountain 0 points
nature 20 nature
Continue 
Instructions
In this example, you would each earn 0 points
because you chose different words
Candidate 
Words
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 mountain 0 points
nature 20 nature
Continue 
Instructions
In this example, as well, you would each earn 0 points
because you chose different words
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Word Payoff if 
match
Flying Car 10
Cartoon 25
Done (see result) 
Please choose one of the two words below. 
If you and your partner choose the same label, you will 
each receive the number of points that is shown for that label. 
Otherwise, you will each earn 0 points for that round.
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Done
Candidate 
Words
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
Helmet 10 Flying Car Flying Car 10 points 
each
Football 25
  
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 7 
 
Study 1, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
8 
 
Study 2, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 1 
 
 
Study 2, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 2 
 
Study 2, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 3 
 
Study 2, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 4 
 
 
 
Important Clarifications:
You will be assigned a new random partner in each round.
Your final payment depends on the total number of points that you
accumulate across all rounds.
In each round, your partner may be shown the words in the same order
as you see them (e.g. “mountain” on top, “nature” on bottom), 
or in the opposite order. This is random.
Continue
Any Questions?
Begin
Please wait for Instructor
Before proceeding
In this experiment, you will be shown a series
of images, one after another.
Beside each image, you will see two words.
For each words, please assign a percentage
or weight between 0 and 100 for each word,
given the image.
Treat each word separately; 
the two numbers do not need to sum to 100
Continue to 
Example
For example, suppose we present the image
on the left and the two words
“mountain” and “nature” as seen below.
You might decide that the word “mountains”
applies with a probability or weight of 65%
and the word “nature” applies with a 
probability or weight of 80%.
Then you’d enter those numbers in the table below
Continue 
Instructions
Label Percentage
mountain ? [%]
nature ? [%]
Regarding the percentages,
you can either think of these as 
the probability or extent to which the word might 
enter your mind in response to the image;
the probability or extent to which the word seems an 
appropriate  description of the picture;
or the probability one would expect to see the word 
in the same context (e.g. webpage, book, etc.) as that word.
Label Percentage
mountain 65 %
nature 80 %
Begin Trial 
Run
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Label Percentage
Flying Car [%]
Cartoon [%] Done (go to 
next image)
For each of the two words, please assign a 
number between 0 and 100 for each word.
The numbers represent 
the probability or extent to which the word might 
enter your mind in response to the image;
the probability or extent to which the word seems an 
appropriate  description of the picture;
or the probability one would expect to see the word 
in the same context (e.g. webpage, book, etc.) as that word.
  
Study 2, Assessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 5 
 
Study 2, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 1 
 
Study 2, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 2 
 
Study 2, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 3 
 
Study 2, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 4 
 
Study 2, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 5 
 
 
Any Questions?
Begin
Please wait for Instructor
Before proceeding
In this experiment, you will be shown a series
of images, one after another.
Beside each image, you will see two words.
In a previous experiment, we asked subjects to assign
a percentage0-100 for each words, given the image.
The two weights are treated separately. They do not need 
to sum to 100.
Your task is to guess what number between 0 and 100
was assigned by other people to each label, given the image.
Your payment for this experiment will depend on how accurate
your guesses are.
Continue to 
Example
For example, consider the image on the left and the two labels
“mountain” and “nature” as seen below.
In a previous experiment, we asked subjects to assign
a percentage 0-100 for each label, given the image.
(the two weights did not need to sum to 100).
Your job is to guess what weight or probabilities they assigned
to each label. For example, you might guess that given this 
image, people would assign a probability or weight of 75% 
to the label “mountain” and a probability of 80% to the label 
“nature”. So, you would enter the numbers “75” and “80”
in the table below
Continue 
Instructions
Label Percentages
mountain ? %
nature ? %
After you make your guesses, the computer will show you
how accurate your guesses were. For each label, 
your guess will be judged according to the absolute
difference between your guess and the actual average 
value assigned to that word by the subjects in the 
previous experiment. Your total score for each image
will depend on the accuracy of the two separate guesses.
An example is shown below.
Continue 
Instructions
Label Percentages you 
guessed was 
assigned by others
Actual percentages 
assigned by others
Absolute 
Difference
mountain 75 % 80 % |75 – 80| = 5
nature 80 % 50 % | 80 – 50| =30
Total error 35
Your points for this image 100-35 = 65 
points
Regarding the numbers,
subjects in the previous experiment were told to
think of these as 
the probability or extent to which the word might 
enter your mind in response to the image;
the probability or extent to which the word seems an 
appropriate  description of the picture;
or the probability one would expect to see the word 
in the same context (e.g. webpage, book, etc.) as that word.
Label Percentages
mountain [%]
nature [%]
Go to 
Practice
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Label Percentages
Flying Car 50 %
Cartoon 65 %
Done (see how 
accurate I was) 
For each of the two words below, please guess what 
percentages between 0 and 100 were assigned by 
other people on average, given the image. The two 
words are treated separately, i.e. the two numbers
do not need to sum to 100.
  
 
Study 2, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 6 
 
 
Study 2, Guessing Treatment, Instructions Screen 7 
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 1 
 
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
2 
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 3 
 
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
4 
 
 
 
Done (go to 
next image)
Label Percentages 
you guessed 
was assigned 
by others
Actual 
percenteages
assigned by 
others
Absolute 
Difference
Flying Car 50 % 80 % 30
Cartoon 65 % 50 % 15
Total error 45
Your points for this image 100-45 = 55 
points this round
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Any Questions?
Begin
Please wait for Instructor
Before proceeding
In this experiment, you will be shown a series
of images, one after another.
Beside each image, you will see two words.
Please choose one of the two words for the image. 
If you and your partner choose the same label, you will each receive 
the number of points that is shown for that round. 
Your payment for this experiment depends on how many points
you accumulate.
Continue to 
Example
For example, consider the image on the left and the two words
“mountain” and “nature” as seen below.
If you and your partner both choose the word “mountain”, 
you will each receive 50 points.
If you and your partner both choose the word “nature”, 
you will each receive 20 points.
If you and your partner choose different words, you will
each receive 0 points for that round.
Continue 
Instructions
Label Payoff if 
match
mountain 50
nature 20
Candidate 
Word
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 mountain mountain 50 points
each
nature 20
Continue 
Instructions
After you and your partner both make
your choices, the computer will show
you what choice your partner made, and
how many points you won (if you matched).
In this example, you would both earn 50 points
Candidate 
word
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 20 points
each
nature 20 Nature Nature
Continue 
Instructions
In this example, you would both earn 20 points
  
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 5 
 
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
5 
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 6 
 
Study 2, Coordinating Treatment, Instructions Screen 
7 Example 
 
 
 
Appendix: All label pairs for Study 1, sets 1 and 2 
Label pair Labels 
 
Average 
Salience of 
Labels to 
subjects in 
Guessing 
treatment  
Set 1 
coordinating 
treatment 
payoffs for 
coordinating 
on this label  
Set 2  
closer 
coordinating 
payoffs  
Candidate 
word
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 mountain 0 points
nature 20 nature
Continue 
Instructions
In this example, you would both earn 0 points
because you chose different words
Candidate 
word
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
mountain 50 mountain 0 points
nature 20 nature
Go to 
Practice
In this example, you would both earn 0 points
because you chose different words
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Label Payoff if 
match
FlyingCar 25
Cartoon 10
Done (see result) 
Please choose one of the two labels for this image. 
If you and your partner choose the same word, 
you will each receive the number of points that is 
shown for that word. Otherwise, you each earn 0
for this round
THIS IS A TRIAL RUN FOR PRACTICE
Done (go to next 
image) 
Candidate 
word
Payoff if 
match partner 
on this word
You 
chose
Your 
partner 
chose
You each 
get
FlyingCar 25 Flying Car Flying Car 10 points 
each
Cartoon 10
 Night 44 109 90 
Europe 56 87 87 
 Checkered pattern 47 69 65 
Doll 53 62 62 
 Cook 58 48 48 
Sharp knife 42 55 50 
 Black flower 45 52 48 
Black rose 55 47 47 
 Black bull 58 77 77 
Bull fallen down 42 78 78 
 Blue logo 48 58 58 
Lion 52 65 60 
 Roll 46 66 60 
Measurement 54 57 57 
 Pray 52 55 55 
Church 48 60 55 
 Sneakers 58 49 49 
Pair of shoes 42 77 50 
 Egg 46 82 73 
Grass 54 70 70 
 Advertisement 44 104 82 
Person 55 82 82 
 Red carpet 53 77 77 
Actor 47 88 80 
 Present 51 78 40 
Teddy bear 49 39 39 
 Building 50 68 68 
Green window 50 68 68 
 Soldier 56 71 71 
Arrest 44 101 101 
 Person 52 50 56 
t-shirt 48 56 56 
 Medical 52 59 59 
Brain 48 75 70 
 Cartoon 46 109 81 
Girl 54 77 77 
 Corpse 40 107 62 
Surgery 60 60 60 
 Knife in sheath 59 77 77 
Knife on fur 41 108 77 
 Africa 51 68 55 
 Giraffe 
49 54 54 
 Pirate coin 41 104 76 
Beach 59 73 73 
 China 46 58 51 
Dragon 54 50 50 
 Fish 51 68 68 
Cup 49 93 69 
 Buffet 52 57 57 
Food 48 63 63 
 Pink dress 46 58 58 
Party 54 67 60 
 Famous painting 52 53 53 
Warrior on a horse 48 57 53 
 Yoga 41 67 52 
Woman 59 48 48 
 Japanese cartoon 45 63 58 
Girl 55 58 63 
 Gray 42 57 41 
Bag 58 52 41 
 
Appendix: All label pairs for Study 2 
Image Labels 
 
Average Salience 
of Labels to 
subjects in 
Guessing 
treatment  
Payoffs 
 
Night 76 70 
Europe 54 108 
 
Checkered pattern 59 90 
Doll 70 84 
 
Cook 83 64 
Sharp knife 44 110 
 
Black flower 68 78 
Black rose 79 61 
 
Black bull 62 86 
Bull fallen down 77 76 
 
Blue logo 78 68 
Lion 58 101 
 
Roll 71 47 
Measurement 61 50 
 
Pray 76 70 
Church 55 97 
Shoes 84 63 
 Single shoes 73 80 
 
Egg 59 90 
Grass 59 90 
 
Advertisement 77 69 
Person 53 91 
 
Red carpet 66 81 
Actor 77 76 
 
Present 68 78 
Teddy bear 45 108 
 
Building 74 72 
Green window 58 92 
 
Soldiers 63 85 
Arrest 77 63 
 
Person 54 99 
t-shirt 80 73 
 
Medical 51 104 
Brain 75 65 
 Cartoon 84 70 
Girl 62 86 
 
Corpse 65 82 
Surgery 38 140 
 
Knife in sheath 71 75 
Knife on fur 77 63 
 
Africa 62 86 
 
Giraffe 
87 56 
 
Pirate coin 51 104 
Beach 39 150 
 
China 53 100 
Dragon 85 57 
 
Fish 51 
 
104 
 
Cup 85 69 
 
Buffet 79 67 
Food 54 90 
Pink dress 73 73 
 Party 62 94 
 
Famous painting 73 77 
Warrior on a horse 63 73 
 
Yoga 54 99 
Woman 75 78 
 
Japanese cartoon 74 72 
Girl 58 101 
 
Gray 56 95 
Bag 81 72 
 
 
